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MINIMUM WAGES FOR- PRISONERS:
LEGAL OBSTACLES AND SUGGESTED REFORMS
The growing literature on prisoners' rights has not yet focused
on inmates' demands for minimum wages and the justification for
such demands. This article explains why statutory minimum wage
coverage should be extended to inmates, discusses the judicial
treatment of prison labor and the minimum wage question, advo-
cates adoption of legislation now pending in Congress, and sug-
gests further legislative reform necessary to implement the min-
imum wage proposal. Many conditions in our prison system are
undoubtedly more harmful and degrading than lack of meaningful
wages.1 This article focuses on only one feasible reform, not on
the priorities of prison reform in general.
The question of minimum wages for inmates should be viewed
against the backdrop of the rapid expansion of prisoners' legal
1 Prison conditions in America are very severe. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A
FREE SOCIETY 159 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CHALLENGE OF CRIME]. The quality of
prison life has not changed substantially since 183 1, when de Beaumont and de Tocque-
ville toured American prisons. See G. DE BEAUMONT& A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE
PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 79
(1964 F. Lieber transl. 1833). An excellent description of life in one prison is given in
ATTICA: THE OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE SPECIAL COMMISSION ON
ATTICA, at 21-102 (1972) [hereinafter cited aSATTICA REPORT].
Other excellent and sometimes pungent descriptions of prison conditions may be found
in Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 -F. Supp. 93 (N.D. Ohio 1971), affd sub om. Jones v.
Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972). See also Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707
(N.D. Ohio 1971); Holt v. Sarver. 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff d, 442 F.2d 304
(8th Cir. 1971); PRISONS, PROTEST, AND POLITICS (B. Atkins & H. Glick eds. 1972); J.
CAMPBELL, J. SAHID, & D. STANG, LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED 622-48 (1970);
HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON CRIME, REFORM OF OUR CORRECTIONAL SYSTEMS. H.R. REP.
No. 93-329. 93d Cong.. 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORTIPRISONS (G.
Leinwand ed. 1972); K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968); J. MITFORD,
KIND & USUAL PUNISHMENT: THE PRISON BUSINESS (1973): Hirschkop & Millemann.
The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REV. 795 (1969); Singer, Prison
Conditions: An Unconstitutional Roadblock to Rehabilitation, 20 CATH. U.L. REV. 365
(1971).
The hope and future of corrections may well lie in community-based corrections, a
concept which has wide support. See, e.g., CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra at 171. 173;
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS4- 11, 38-44 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE
REPORT]; Recommendation 33 of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions (1971). and Part IV, Toward Community-Based Corrections, of the President's Task
Force on Prisoner Rehabilitation (1970), both appearing in Part VIII, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES AND SERVICES and COUNCIL
OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, COMPENDIUM OF MODEL CORRECTIONAL LEGISLATION AND
STANDARDS Villi 19, 26 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ABA COMPENDIUM].
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rights and the growing realization that inmates must be treated as
human beings. 2 Prisoners have won important legal victories in
the areas of due process,3 mail rights, 4 access to the courts, 5 right
to medical care, 6 freedom of religion,7 political rights," freedom
from racial discrimination,9 fairness of parole revocation,10 and
elimination of cruel and unusual punishment." This expansion of
prisoners' theoretical rights is due to a new judicial interest in and
willingness to deal with inmate rights, representing a departure
from the strict "hands-off' doctrine.' 2
Prisoners are no longer regarded as "slaves of the state";' 3 now
2See Burger, Our Options are Limited, 18 VILL. L. REV. 165 (1972). Several bills
dealing with prisoner rights are now pending in Congress. See, e.g., H.R. 2583 (minimum
prison and parole standards), H.R. 4188, H.R. 5202, and H.R. 8264 (Prisoner Rights
Acts), 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973). See generally HOUSE REPORT, supra note I, at 55-58,
the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals recommen-
dations on prisoners' rights.
On emerging prisoners' rights in general, see D. RuDOVSKv, THE RIGHTS OF PRISON-
ERS: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO A PRISONER'S RIGHTS (1973); SOUTH CAROLINA DEP'T
OF CORRECTION, THE EMERGING RIGHTS OF THE CONFINED (1972); Goldfarb & Singer,
Redressing Prisoners' Grievances, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 175 (1970); Hirschkop,
Crisman, & Millemann, Litigating An Affirmative Prisoners' Rights Action, I I AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 39 (1972); Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5 HARV. CIV.
RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 227 (1970); Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons:
A Manual for Prisoners' Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV. 473 (1971); Note, 57 VA. L.
REV. 841 (1971); Note, 53 IOWA L. REV. 671 (1967).3 See, e.g., Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, affd in
part, rev'd in part sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 197 1),cert. denied
sub nom. Oswald v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
4 See, e.g., Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 451 F.2d 545 (1 st Cir. 1971).
5 See, e.g., Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1946); Palmigiano v. Travisono, 317 F. Supp.
776 (D.R.I. 1970).
6 See, e.g., Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1970); Tolbert v. Eyman, 434
F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1970).7 See, e.g., Long v. Parker, 390 F.2d 816 (3d Cir. 1968); Northern v. Nelson, 315
F. Supp. 687 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'4 443 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1971)
8 See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied sub nom.
Oswald v. Sostre, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
SSee, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
10 See, e.g., Morrissey-v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
11 See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
12 Although the courts have abandoned the strict "hands-off" doctrine, under which they
almost invariably refused to interfere with prison administration (See Goldfarb & Singer,
supra note 2, at 181-85 (1970); Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of
Judical Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963)), judges
still hesitate to enter this area, and prison officials are accorded wide latitude in prison
affairs. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178,
205 (2d Cir. 1971); Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1970). The role of the
courts in prison reform has been addressed in the very thoughtful opinions of Judge James
E. Doyle in Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis. 1972), rev'd, -F.2d.- (7th
Cir. 1973), and Mabra v. Schmidt, 356 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. Wis. 1973) and Doyle, The
Court's Responsibility to the Inmate Litigant, 56 JUDICATURE 406 (1973). See also
Edwards, Forward-Penitentiaries Produce No Penitents, 63J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY, &
POLICE SCI. 154 (1972); Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, Judicial Intervention in
Prison Discipline, 63 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE SCI. (1972); Pollack & Smith,
Courts as a Vehicle for Prison Reform, 56 JUDICATURE 413 (1973); Singer & Keating, The
Courts and the Prisons: A Crisis of Confrontation, 9 CRIM. L. BULL. 337 (1973); Spaeth,
The Courts' Responsibility for Prison Reform, 16 VILL. L. REV. 1031 (1971).
'3 In Ruffin v. Virginia, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871), the court said that:
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the question is which of two more enlightened views of prisoners'
rights should govern. Courts often cite the Supreme Court's state-
ment that "Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary with-
drawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction
justified by the considerations underlying our penal system."' 14
But many believe the better view is found in the dictum of the
Sixth Circuit in Coffin v. Reichard:15 "A prisoner retains all the
rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by neces-
sary implication, taken away from him by law." 1 6 These two
views are not mutually exclusive. They do, however, represent
different starting points, and one's thinking concerning the min-
imum wage proposal largely depends upon how the matter is
approached. The Coffin rationale has been accepted and rein-
forced by commentators and legislators, and it is submitted that
this philosophy should govern the analysis of all prison conditions
as well as prisoners' legal rights. 17
I. THE CASE FOR MINIMUM WAGES
FOR PRISONERS
A. Prison Labor, Working Conditions, and Wages
Almost all penologists agree that productive work activity is
central to inmates' rehabilitation.' 8 The importance of work in the
prison program lies in its role in preventing idleness, boosting
A convicted felon, whom the law in its humanity punishes by confinement in
the penitentiary instead of with death, is subject while undergoing that
punishment, to all the laws which the Legislature in its wisdom may enact for
the government of that institution and the control of its inmates. For the time
being, during his term of service in the penitentiary, he is in a state of penal
servitude to the state. He has, as a consequence of his crime, not only
forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in
its humanity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the State.
He is civiliter mortuus;and his estate, if he has any, is administered like that
of a dead man.
Id. at 795-96.
14 Price v. Johnston. 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
15 Coffin v. Reichard. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944).
16 Id. at 445.
17See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 167 (1971);
ATTICA REPORT, supra note I, at xvi; Committee on the Model Act for the National
Council on Crime and DelinquencyA Model Act to Provide for Minimum Standards for
the Protection of Rights of Prisoners, 18 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 4, 10 (1972); Hollen.
Emerging Prisoners' Rights, 33 OHIO ST. L. J. 1 (1972).
In the HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1. recommendation 13 suggests:
So That Inmates Will Be Qualified To Meet Their Responsibilities as Cit-
izens Upon Their Release, it is Essential That They Retain The Rights of
Other Citizens Except Those Which Have Been Expressly Denied by Law.
Id. at 51 .See also H.R. 4188 and H.R. 8264, 93d Cong.. I st Sess. (1973).
18 The importance of work is recognized in Principle XXX of the Declaration of
Principles of the American Correctional Association (1970), reprinted in ABA COM-
FALL 1973]
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morale, easing tension, and reducing discipline problems, and in
its contribution to effective and economical prison adminis-
tration.19 The most important attribute of prison labor is its ability
to impart healthy work attitudes, productive habits, and useful
skills -all important elements in offenders' rehabilitation. 20
The importance of work activity has been recognized since
institutional prisons were established in this country. Work was a
prominent feature of the prison systems developed in the United
States during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.
The Pennsylvania or Quaker system emphasized solitary work in
individual cells, while the Auburn design, developed in New
York, provided for joint labor with solitary confinement during
nonworking hours. The Auburn prison was established in 1821
and rapidly became a profit-making venture. Because of its suc-
cess, it became the prototype American prison. 21 The Auburn
model always featured a prison shop or collective labor, but four
distinct organizational systems developed: lease, contract,
piece-price, and state or public account. 22 The lease and contract
systems lent themselves to prisoner abuse and exploitation. 23
Under all four systems prisoners competed with nonconvict labor.
PENDIUM, supra note I. at X-77. and by the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners. Report Prepared By the Secretariat. FIRST UNITED NATIONS
CONGRESS ON THE PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf/6/l. at 72 (1956) [hereinafter cited as U.N. MINIMUM RULES]. See also
AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 387.
390 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as ACA MANUAL]; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1. at
27-30; PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON PRISONER REHABILITATION (1970). PART II, JOBS
AND JOB TRAINING, reprinted in ABA COMPENDIUM. supra note I. at VIII-24 (1972);
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note I, at 183; M. RICHMOND, PRISON PROFILES 50-51
(1965); Goldart, Corrections: The Plight of Reform, I U. MD. L.F. 27 (1971); Lopez-Ray.
Some Considerations of the Character and Organization of Prison Labour, 49 J. CRIM. L.,
CRIMINOLOGY. & POLICE SCI. 10 (1958); Singer. supra note I. at 381.
19 See Sturdevant, Goals of Correctional Industries in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NINE-
TY-NINTH ANNUAL CONGRESS OF CORRECTIONS OF THE AM. CORRECTIONAL ASS'N 56,
57 (1969). See also note 18supra.
20 ACA MANUAL, supra note 18, at 387: Leopold, What is Wrong with the Prison
System?, 45 NEB. L. REV. 33. 51 (1966). Cf G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOCQUEVILLE,
supra note I. at 67. For a somewhat dated, but comprehensive, survey of prison labor and
attitudes concerning it see L. ROBINSON, SHOULD PRISONERS WORK? (193 1).
21 On the history of American prison labor see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at 25-28;
M. RICHMOND, supra note 18. at 1-5. An excellent description and appraisal of prison
labor as of 1831 is found in G. DE BEAUMONT & DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1.
22 Under the lease system convicts were turned over to an entrepreneur for a specified
time, while in the contract system the state sold the inmate's labor, but retained control
and custody over him. From 1830- 1870 these systems provided most of the inmate
employment in state penal systems. The piece-price system was a form of the contract
system in which the entrepreneur furnished raw materials and machinery and paid a price
for each finished product. Under the state or public account system the state manufactured
and sold goods on the open market. ACA MANUAL, supra note 18, at 393-94; E.
JOHNSON, CRIME, CORRECTION, AND SOCIETY 560 (1968); Goldart, supra note 18, at 28.
See also G. DE BEAUMONT& A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 68.
2 ACA MANUAL, supra note 18, at 12; E. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 562; M.
RICHMOND, supra note 18, at 6.
[VOL. 7:193
Prisoner Minimum Wages
During the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth
century, private industry and organized labor secured the passage
of restrictive legislation that required labeling of convict-made
goods, prevented contracting-out of convict labor, and prohibited
sale of prison-made goods on the open market. 24 In 1929, the
Hawes-Cooper Act 25 authorized state regulation of commerce in
convict-made goods, thereby subjecting prison products to restric-
tive state legislation. The Ashurst-Sumners Act 26 made it a crime
to transport prison-made goods in interstate commerce in viola-
tion of state law and required that such goods be labeled. This Act
was amended in 194027 to place a flat ban on interstate trans-
portation of prison-made goods and remains law today. 28 These
statutes delivered a death blow to the contract and lease systems,
which had provided steady employment in prisons, at a time when
their objectionable features were being removed. 29 The state-use
system, in which the state employs prisoners to make goods for
use by state and local government or to construct and repair
public works, became and remains the predominant prison labor
model.3 0 The development of serious legislative restrictions on
prison labor and the attendant shift to the state-use system has
had disastrous effects on the employment rate in prisons.3 '
Idleness is the rule in prison today;3 2 as many as one-third of
24 HOUSE REPORT, supra note I. at 26-27. For a more thorough discussion of this
legislation and suggestions for reform, see notes 224-43 and accompanying text infra.
25 49 U.S.C. § 60 (1970). The Act was held constitutional in Whitfield v. Ohio. 297 U.S.
431 (1936).
2649 Stat. 494 (1935). The Act was held constitutional in Kentucky Whip & Collar Co.
v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937).
27 54 Stat. 1134 (1940). See S. REP. No. 1389. 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940); H.R. REP.
No. 2933. 76th Cong.. 3d Sess. (1940); 86 CONG. REC. 11930 (1940) (remarks of
Representatives Sumners and Healey).
28 18 U.S.C. §§ 1761-62 (1970). For a discussion of the history of the Hawes-Cooper
and Ashurst-Sumners Acts and the litigation upholding them see H. HAWES, POWER OF
CONGRESS TO PROTECT STATE LAWS(1938).
29 E. JOHNSON, supra note 22. at 561.
30ACA MANUAL. supra note 18. at 394; HOUSE REPORT. supra note I. at 26-27. For a
survey of the various academic, vocational and employment programs authorized by
statute in the states see State Correctional Law Chart 4, H. PERLMAN & W. RUDOLPH,
HANDBOOK FOR CORRECTIONAL LAW REFORM (1972), reprinted in ABA COMPENDIUM,
supra note I. at X-94-97.
31 For a discussion of the detrimental effects of the Hawes-Cooper and Ash-
urst-Sumners Acts on prisons in the 1930's see J. BENNETT. American Prisons-Houses
of Idleness (1935). The Passing of the Industrial Prison (1937). Horse Collars and Prisons
(1937). and Economics of Prisons (1938). in OF PRISONS AND JUSTICE-A SELECTION OF
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES V. BENNETT. S. DOC. No. 70, 88th Cong.. 2d Sess.. at 1-5. 6-9,
10- 13. 28-30 (1964). See also Singer. supra note 1. at 381-82. In 1885. 75 percent of
prison inmates were productively employed; by 1940 the percentage had dropped to 44
percent. The drop in employment corresponded with the shift in prison employment
patterns from 74 percent lease, contract, and piece-price labor and 26 percent state-use
employment in 1885 to almost 100 percent state-use labor in 1940. HOUSE REPORT, supra
note I. at 27.32 CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note I. at 176; M. RICHMOND. supra note 18. at 6.
FALL 19731
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all prison inmates either are assigned to overmanned positions or
do not work at all.33 Much of the available work is unproductive,
boring, and meaningless. 34 Inmates who are able to work are
frequently assigned tasks designed only to keep them busy.35
Prison industry jobs, when available, usually have little in com-
mon with jobs outside the walls, since prison industries are gener-
ally antiquated and inefficient.a6 Despite the agreement on the
importance of meaningful work in the rehabilitation process, pri-
son work programs and industries fail to realize their rehabilita-
tive potential.
The costs of the failures of the prison work system are
enormous. Idle inmates do nothing to offset the cost of keeping
them in prison, and untrained convicts are unable to support
themselves upon release.3 The federal prison industry system is
generally acknowledged as the best in this country,38 yet approx-
imately 85 percent of the inmates leaving federal prisons have no
marketable skill. 39 Beyond the economic costs of the present
system is its human toll. Inmates, like other workers, rebel at
being forced to do useless work. 40 The present prison labor sys-
tem breeds apathy, contempt, cynicism, and hostility. 41
33 Singer. supra note I, at 381.
34 R. CLARK, CRIME IN AMERICA 194 (1970): Rothman. You Can't Ref)rm the Bastille,
NATION, Mar. 19. 1973, at 361-62. For a description of the type of work available in
prisons see ATTICA REPORT. supra note I. at 36-37 and J. MITFORD, supra note I, at
189-215.
35 Leopold, supra note 20. at 5 1: HOUSE REPORT. supra note I. at 28.
36 ACA MANUAL. supra note 18. at 16: HOUSE REPORT, supra note I. at 27-28: TASK
FORCE REPORT. supra note I. at 55; Leopold. supra note 20. at 51. But (f 18 U.S.C.
§ 4123 (1970):
Such forms of employment shall be provided as will give inmates of all
Federal penal and correctional institutions a maximum opportunity to acquire
a knowledge and skill in trades and occupations which will provide them with
a means of earning a livelihood upon release.
37 See HOUSE REPORT, supra note I. at 29; CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 1. at 176.
3 8 CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note I, at 176.
39 Oversight Hearings on the Nature and Effectiveness of the Rehabilitation Programs
of the Bureau of Prisons Before the Subcomm. on National Penitentiaries of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.. 2d Sess., at 5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Oversight
Hearings). Cf de Beaumont and de Tocqueville's description of the nineteenth century
prison:
Perhaps, leaving the prison he is not an honest man. but he has contracted
honest habits. He was an idler: now he knows how to work. His ignorance
prevented him from pursuing a useful occupation; now he knows how to read
and to write; and the trade which he has learnt in the prison, furnishes him
the means of existence which formerly he had not.
G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOCQUEVILLE. supra note I. at 90.
40 Leopold, supro note 20, at 51 ; Singer. supra note I, at 382.
41 ACA MANUAL, supra note 18, at 39 1; Leopold, supra note 20. at 51; R, Singer, supra
note I. at 38 1-82. The shortcomings of the state-use system are described in Lopez-Rey.
supra note 18, at 15; and N. Singer, Incentives and the Use of Prison Labor, 19 CRIME
AND DELINQUENCY 200, 202 (1973).
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Wages paid to working inmates do not compensate for unsatis-
factory working conditions; indeed, they have been characterized
as a joke42 and absurd. 43 In 1972, inmates in federal prisons were
paid between seventeen and forty-nine cents per hour for work
performed in the Federal Prison Industries. 44 The states, on the
whole, are not as generous as the -federal government. In 1957,
daily wages in state prisons ranged from $0.04 to $1.30 and the
average was $0.34 per day. 45 These shockingly low wages reflect
an overall spending pattern in which 95 percent of all prison
expenditures are for "custody-iron bars, stone walls, guards,"
and only 5 percent is spent for "hope-health services, education,
developing employment skills." 46
B. Why the Minimum Wage?
The adverse effects of present wage levels provide perhaps the
best reason for paying inmates the minimum wage. A sense of
dignity and self-respect is important to inmates. 47 Experts in cor-
42 Oversight Hearings, supra note 39, at 54 (testimony of F. Lee Bailey).
43 N. Singer, supra note 41, at 201.
44 118 CONG. REC. S5952 (daily ed. Apr. 12, 1972) (remarks of Senator Mathias). Wages
on this scale ranged from $10 to $75 per month in 1967; the average in 1960 was $31.36
per month and in 1965 it was $38.00. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note I. at 183;
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CRIME AND ITS IMPACT- AN ASSESSMENT 59, n. 147 (1967). Under
18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1970), the Federal Prison Industries corporation is authorized to pay
compensation to inmates under rules and regulations promulgated by the Attorney Gener-
al. The Attorney General's authority to prescribe rules and regulations for inmate com-
pensation has been transferred to the Board of Directors of the Federal Prison Industries
or such officer as the Board designates. 28 C.F.R. § 0.99 (1972).
45 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 183. The wages at Attica in September. 1971,
ranged from $0.20 to $1.00 per day, but until October of 1970 the range was $0.06 to
$0.29 per day. ATTICA REPORT, supra note 1, at 49, n.35. The monthly range in Septem-
ber, 1971, was $4.40 to $22.00 per month and the average was $7.00 to $7.50. ATTICA
REPORT, supra note 1, at 50. Almost all states delegate the power to set wages to the
Department of Corrections, its director, or a similar body or officer, but some statutes set
limits within which the wages must fall. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE§ 2700 (West 1970)
(not less than 2 cents nor more than 35 cents per hour); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 1003-12-5 (Supp. 1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 127, §§ 48, 48A (1972), as amended,
(Supp. 1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.332 (Supp. 1973). See also id. § 800.101
(1968), as amended, (Supp. 1973) (convicts working on roads to be paid a fair and just
compensation); N.Y. CORREC. LAW § 187 (McKinney 1968), as amended, (McKinney
Supp. 1972); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5147.22 (Page 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 256
(1964) and tit. 71, § 305 (1962) (minimum of 10 cents per day). See also MODEL PENAL
CODE §§ 303.7(3), 304.8(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) and NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, STANDARD ACT FOR STATE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, § 15
(1966). For a survey of state wage-authorizing statutues and the deductions and dis-
tributions that are authorized under them see State Correctional Law Chart 6. in H.
PERLMAN & W. RUDOLPH, HANDBOOK FOR CORRECTIONAL LAW REFORM (1972), re-
printed in ABA COMPENDIUM, supra note 1, at X-102-106.
46 R. CLARK, supra note 34, at 193;Oversight Hearings, supra note 39, at 5.47 This was clearly demonstrated by the rebellion at Attica. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 19,
1971, at 58, col. 2.
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rections 48 and judges 49 realize that a successful rehabilitation pro-
gram must restore dignity, integrity and self-confidence. It is
recognized that wages in prisons can do much to further this
goal, 50 yet present wages have the opposite effect. 5 1 Today's
prison wages lend neither dignity nor significance to prison jobs or
the inmates holding them. 5 2
Although removal of the negative effects of the present wage
system substantially justifies minimum wages for prisoners, re-
form would have other benefits as well. Equitable pay-for work
performed in prison would allow inmates to support their families,
thereby reducing the welfare rolls, improving the economic lot of
prisoners' families, and enabling inmates to maintain strong, family
ties. 53 Receipt of the minimum wage would also help inmates
learn to handle finances 54 and would allow them to pay into and
qualify for social security 5 Finally, if the minimum wage were
paid to prisoners, they would have a greater incentive to work
efficiently and to develop improved work habits. 56
48 Pollack & Smith, supra note 12, at 414; Rothstein, Corrections is Based on the
Dignity of Man, 34 FED. PROB., Mar., 1970, at 38. See ATTICA REP., supra note I, at xvii.49Mr. Justice Brennan. in his concurring opinion in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
281 (1972). indicated that the effect on dignity is a measure of cruel and unusual punish-
ment. See also Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
5 0 ACA MANUAL, supra note 18. at 393; E. JOHNSON, supra note 22. at 567; TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note I. at 55; Lopez-Rey. supra note 18, at 25.
51 Report Prepared by the Secretariat, SECOND UNITED NATIONS CONGRESS ON THE
PREVENTION OF CRIME AND THE TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 17/20, at 64 (1960) [hereinafter cited as U.N. TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS].
52 Clendenen, What's the Matter with Corrections?, 35 FED. PROB., Sept., 1971, at 8,
10.53 See E. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 567; Board of Trustees, National Council on
Crime and Delinquency Compensation of Inmate Labor: A Policy Statement, 18 CRIME
AND DELINQUENCY 333 1972) [hereinafter cited as NCCD Policy Statement ]; Oversight
Hearings, supra note 39, at 16, 55; J. BASALO, THE INTEGRATION OF PRISON LABOUR
WITH THE NATIONAL ECONOMY, INCLUDING THE REMUNERATION OF PRISONERS: GEN-
ERAL REPORT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.17/1. at 36-38 (1960); Report Prepared by the
Secretariat, PRE-RELEASE TREATMENT AND AFTER-CARE AS WELL AS ASSISTANCE TO
DEPENDENTS OF PRISONERS, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 17/9, at 18- 19 (1960). See also U.N.
TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS, supra note 5I. at 64-65.
54 ATTICA REPORT, supra note 1, at 5 I.55 This benefit is mentioned in J. BASALO, supra note 53, at 38; U.N. TREATMENT OF
OFFENDERS, supra note 51, at 63. A bill currently pending in Congress would authorize
social security coverage for inmates. H.R. 6747, 93d Cong.. Ist Sess. (1973) See also,
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 168-69 (1971).56 J. BASALO, supra note 53, at 38; E. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 567 (1968); Report
Prepared by the Secretariat, THE INTEGRATION OF PRISON LABOUR WITH THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY, INCLUDING THE REMUNERATION OF PRISONERS, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 17/2, at
3 (1960). Imposition of the minimum wage would also make a program of compensation
for the victims of crime possible. See J. BASALO, supra note 53, at 38; Report Prepared by
the Secretariat, supra at 3, 28; Edwards, Compensation to Victims of Crimes of Personal
Violence, 30 FED. PROB., June, 1966, at 3; Galaway & Hudson, Restitution and Rehabili-
tation: Some Central Issues, 18 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 403 (1972); Wolfgang, Victim
Compensation in Crimes of Personal Violence, 50 MINN. L. REV. 223 (1965); Comment,
Crime Victims' Compensation- Title I of the Proposed Victims of Crime Act of 1973: An
Analysis, I FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 421 (1973).
Prisoner Minimum Wages
Another reason for paying the minimum wage for prison labor
is that inmates feel equitable wages are important. 5 7 Convicts
regard their wages as degrading5" and feel that they are exploited
by prison industries. 59 Application of the New York minimum
wage laws to prison labor was demanded by the rebellious prison-
ers at Attica and was one of the twenty-eight concessions offered
by Commissioner Russell G. Oswald.60 Minimum wages have
been an issue in many prison strikes or disturbances in state and
federal prisons, 61 and they are a goal of several prisoner unions.
6 2
In view of widespread prisoner agitation for minimum wages,
63
maintenance of prison order alone may indicate that the proposal
should be given serious consideration.
Objections to the minimum wage proposal have been and will
be raised. The most important of these objections is the cost of
such a program. 6 4 It costs an estimated $11,000 per year to keep
a married man in prison, based on the prisoner's loss of earnings,
the cost of keeping him, the loss of taxes, and the cost of provid-
ing relief to his family. 65 If the prisoner is paid the minimum wage,
charged for his room and board, and obliged to support his family,
part of this cost would be recouped. Some estimate that, if prison-
ers were to receive the minimum wage, the costs of maintaining
inmates would not be greater than they are now;6 6 but even if
57 Taylor, The Correctional Institution As a Rehabilitation Center-A Former Inmate's
View, 16 VILL. L. REv. 1077, 1078 (1971).
58 ATTICA REPORT, supra note 1, at 50- 5 1.
59 ATTICA REPORT, supra note 1, at 39; NCCD Policy Statement, supra note 53, at 333.6 0 ATTICA REPORT, supra note I, at 253; Prisons: The Way to Reform, TIME, Sept. 27
1971, at 31.
61 Instances include federal prisons at Danbury. Connecticut, N.Y. Times. Mar. 3, 1972.
at 44. col. 6; Somers, Connecticut. id.; Terra Haute, Indiana, The Freeworld Times. Nov.,
1972, at 8, col. 3; and Lewisburg. Pennsylvania. id., Feb.. 1972. at 16. col. 3; and state
prisons at Philadelphia (Holmesburg), id., Jan.. 1973. at I. col. 2; Lansing, Kansas. id.,
Feb., 1972. at 10, col. I; Canon City, Colorado. id., Jan.. 1972. at 7. col. I; Walpole,
Massachusetts. id., at 6, col. 3; Windsor, Vermont. id.; Arizona State Prison, id., Aug..
1972. at 2, col. 2; Draper. Utah. id., July. 1972, at 12, col. 4; Comstock. New York (Great
Meadows). N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1973, at 37, col. 1; and Michigan City, Indiana. Detroit
Free Press, Sept. 4. 1973. at I. col. 4.62 These unions include the United Prisoners Union, UNITED PRISONERS UNION BILL
OF RIGHTS, Art. II1, Sec. II, in Hearings on Corrections Before Subcomm. No. 3 of tile
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 15, pt. 2, at 357 (1971), N.Y.
Times. Sept. 26. 1971. at 74, col. I; the National Prisoners Alliance. id., May 16. 1972. at
86, col. 17; and the California Prisoners Union. Seidman, The Prisoner and the Union,
THE NATION, July 5. 197 1. at 6-7.
63The prisoners' desire for minimum wages is discussed in Browning, Organizing
Behind Bars, RAMPARTS, Feb., 1972, at 40-45, reprinted in PRISONS, PROTEST, AND
POLITICS, supra note 1, at 132-39 and Goldfarb, The Voices Inside, JURIS DOCTOR, Dec.,
1971, at 48-49.64 J. BASALO, supra note 53, at 44, and E. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 568.
6 Oversight Hearings, supra note 39, at 39. This estimate is by the American
Correctional Association. The cost of keeping prisoners was set at $10.24 per day in
federal prisons and $5.24 per day in state institutions.
66 Lopez-Rey, supra note 18. at 26.
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costs increase, they must be measured against the benefits of the
minimum wage6 7 and the social costs of the present system.
Some will assert that minimum wages could lead to even more
unemployment in prisons. 68 Others will argue that loss of earning
capacity is a part of punishment and that minimum wages will
reduce the deterrent effect of potential incarceration. Still others
will maintain that it is unfair to pay the minimum wage to prison-
ers when some nonconvict labor is not covered. 69 These concerns
have some justification, but it must be remembered that 95 per-
cent of the nation's inmates return to society. 70 It has been point-
ed out that:
The experience of these inmates while in prison will largely
determine their chances of becoming productive and law-
abiding citizens after release. Thus, what happens in prison is
of critical importance not only to the relatively few offenders
who are caught and convicted of crimes but also the nation,
which faces a general crisis of crime control. 71
The issue is not whether minimum wages will amount to "cod-
dling" criminals; the question is whether, when the long-run so-
cietal and economic costs of the present system are considered,
67 Some of the benefits which would arise from the payment of minimum wages are
demonstrated by the success of work-release. In the 1960"s work-release programs grew
rapidly and they have been hailed as a success. Ayer, Work-Release Programs in the
United States: Some Difficulties Encountered, 34 FED. PROB., Mar., 1970, at 53; Carpen-
ter. The Federal Work Release Program, 45 NEB. L. REV. 690 (1960); Goldart, supra
note 18, at 27; Grupp. Work-Release- the Sheriffs Viewpoint, 13 CRIME AND DELIN-
QUENCY 513 (1967); N. Singer. supra note 41. at 200; Zalba, Work-Release-A
Two-Pronged Effort, 13 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 506 (1967).
For a survey of state statutory provisions dealing with work-release or furlough pro-
grams see State Correctional Law Chart 5. in H. PERLMAN & W. RUDOLPH, HANDBOOK
FOR CORRECTIONAL LAW REFORM (1972), reprinted in ABA COMPENDIUM, supra note I,
at X-98-101. As early as 1967 it was recommended that such programs be expanded,
CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note I. at 177, and similar recommendations have been
made since. See e.g., Recommendation 33 of the Advisory Commission on In-
tergovernmental Relations (1971). reprinted in ABA COMPENDIUM, supra note I, at
VIII-19; N. Singer, supra note 41, at 206-1I; AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE,
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 168 (1971). Prisoners in work-release programs are generally paid
going wage rates, Zalba, supra at 509. and many of the advantages of work-release would
also be provided by minimum wages. Prison authorities cite the ability of the prisoner to
reimburse the state for room and board, to support his family, to retain a greater measure
of self-respect, and to accumulate savings by the time for release, as major advantages of
work-release programs. ACA MANUAL, supra note 18. at 17; Carpenter, supra at 691-92;
Grupp, supra at 517- 18; HOUSE REPORT, supra note I, at 38; Zalba, supra at 506.
68 It is argued that minimum wages increase unemployment and cause noneconomic
factors such as racial discrimination to play a larger role in the job market. See Campbell
& Campbell, State Minimum Wage Laws As a Cause of Unemployment, 35 S. ECON. J.
323 (1969); Demsetz, Minorities in the Market Place, 43 N.C.L. REV. 271 (1965). Cf G.
BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1957). These economic analyses assume a
free market and thus are not strictly applicable to the prison labor situation.
69J. BASALO, supra note 53, at 44; E. JOHNSON, supra note 22, at 586.70 Turner, supra note 2, at 473.
71 Id. at 473-74.
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the short-run costs of paying minimum wages to prisoners are
justified.72
The answer seems to be that the extra costs, if any, of min-
imum wages are justified. The National Council on Crime and
Delinquency issued a policy statement in 1972 calling for min-
imum wages in prisons. 73 The United Nations Standard Minimum
Rules for the Treatment of Offenders and other United Nations
documents support the concept. 74 A host of writers have recom-
mended that the minimum wage should be paid to inmates in
American prisons. 75 The experts in corrections seem unanimously
to support the proposal; the logic behind the idea is compelling
76
and objections have yet to be made convincingly. If prisoners are
not entitled to the minimum wage under present law, the law
should be changed.
I1. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
Although relatively few cases have considered the issue, sev-
eral different theories have been employed in attempts to secure
minimum wage protection for inmates. Prisoners have asserted
claims under federal and state statutes, common law theories, and
the Constitution. For a variety of reasons, all these attempts have
failed. A discussion of the precedents is useful, however, in eval-
uating the need for legislative action. The courts have also in-
dicated that there may be circumstances in which a prisoner wage
72 See TASK FORCE REPORT. supra note I. at 16.73 NCCD Policy Statement, supra note 53. at 333-34.
74 U.N. MINIMUM RULES. supra note 18. at 72. See Besharov & Mueller. The Demands
of the Inmates of Attica State Prison and The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules
for the Treatment of Prisoners: A Comparison, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 839. 843 (1972). See
also J. BASALO, supra note 53; Report Prepared by the Secretariat, supra note 53; and
Report Prepared by the Secretariat, supra note 56.
7 See, e.g., J. CAMPBELL, J. SAHID & D. STANG, supra note I. at 645: M. RICHMOND.
supra note 18. at 48: Fitch. An Introduction to Prison Reform Legislation, 5 CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REV. 627, 663 (1972); Goldfarb & Singer. supra note 2. at 208; Lopez-Rey.
supra note 18, at 24; Morris & Hawkins. Rehabilitation: Rhetroic and Reality, 34 FED.
PROB.. Dec.. 1970. at 9. 14: Law Student Division. American Bar Association. Resolu-
tions Adopted by the Executive Board, 1972 Annual Meeting, STUDENT LAWYER. Dec..
1972. at 56. See also, ACA MANUAL. supra note 18. at 83. 90. 393: L. ROBINSON. supra
note 20. at 296-97; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note I. at 210: HOUSE REPORT. Supra
note 1. at 50-52; Report of the President's Task Force on Prisoner Rehabilitation (Apr..
1970). in 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 242, 254 (1971); Clendenen. What's the Matter with Correc-
tions?, 35 FED. PROB., Sept., 1971, at 8. 10; Leopold. supra note 20. at 51; Report
Prepared by the Secretariat. supra note 53: N. Singer. supra note 41: J. STRATTON & J.
WEST, THE ROLE OF CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIES- A SUMMARY REPORT (1972): Williams
& FISH. Rehabilitation and Economic Self-Interest, 17 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY
406 (1971); Comment, Labor Unions f-sr Prison Inmates: An Analysis of a Recent
Proposal fsr the Organization of Inmate Labor, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 963. 984 (1972). Cf.
Democratic Party Platform, 30 CONG. Q., July 15. 1972. at 1740.
76 Morris & Hawkins. supra note 75. at 14.
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claim could be successful. In order to understand the judicial
treatment of the minimum wage issue, a brief discussion of the
law surrounding prison labor is necessary. Many of the cases
discussed below were decided before the decline of the
"hands-off" doctrine, but courts are not likely to modify the law in
this area of prisoners' rights.
A. The Legal Status of Prisoners
and Prison Labor
An inmate does not have to work until convicted, 77 but once
convicted, he has no federally protected right not to work. 78 The
courts have unanimously held that prisoners can be required to
work 79 and many states dictate this requirement by statute.80 If
individual inmates refuse to work, they may be placed in solitary
confinement. 8 1 Inmates may also be collectively punished follow-
ing a work stoppage protesting prison conditions.8 2 Courts have
said that the labor of convicts belongs to the state, 83 and any
wages for inmate labor are paid as a matter of grace.8 4 Where
wages are earned, a percentage may be withheld by the state in a
77 Parks v. Ciccone, 281 F. Supp. 805 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Johnston v. Ciccone, 260
F. Supp. 553 (W.D. Mo. 1966); Tyler v. Harris. 226 F. Supp. 852 (W.D. Mo. 1964);
McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
78 Draper v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193. 197 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963),
rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 982 (1964). See also Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709 (8th Cir.
1964). cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964); Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963).
79 Granville v. Hunt. 411 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1969); Rhodes v. Meyer. 334 F.2d 709 (8th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 915 (1964); Stiltner v. Rhay. 322 F.2d 314 (9th Cir.
1963); Draper v. Rhay. 315 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963).
rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 982 (1964); Meyers v. Alldredge. 348 F. Supp. 807 (M.D. Pa.
1972); Fallis v. United States. 263 F. Supp. 780 (M.D. Pa. 1967); Watson v. Industrial
Comm'n, 100 Ariz. 327, 414 P.2d 144 (1966); Moore v. Murphy, 254 Iowa 969, 119
N.W.2d 759 (1963); State Bd. of Charities and Corrections v. Hays. 190 Ky. 147, 227
S.W. 282 (Ky. App. 1920).
80See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 2700 (West 1970); OHio REV. CODE ANN. §5147.03
(Page 1970), as amended, (Page Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 305 (1962); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6166x-1 (1970).
81 Granville v. Hunt, 411 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1969); Fallis v. United States, 263 F. Supp.
780 (M.D. Pa. 1967).
82 See Meyers v. Alldredge, 348 F. Supp. 807 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
83 Huntley v. Gunn Furniture Co., 79 F. Supp. 110, 113 (W.D. Mich. 1948); State
Bd. of Charities and Corrections v. Hays, 190 Ky. 147, 227 S.W.282 (Ky. App. 1920).
84Sigler v. Lowrie. 404 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 940(1969);
Shain v. Idaho State Penitentiary, 77 Idaho 292, 294, 291 P.2d 870, 871 (1955) (dictum);
State Bd. of Charities and Corrections v. Hays, 190 Ky. 147, 154, 227 S.W. 282, 286 (Ky.
App. 1920). But cf. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). affd, 442 F.2d
304 (8th Cir. 1971), where the district court noted:
It is one thing for the State not to pay a convict for his labor; it is something
else to subject him to a situation in which he has to sell his blood to obtain
money to pay for his own safety, or for adequate food, or for access to
needed medical attention.
309 F. Supp. at 381.
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savings account;85 items purchased with wages may be taken
away; 6 and a prisoner's pay may be canceled to reimburse the
state for the costs of returning him to prison after his escape.8 7
Prisoners have not fared well in litigation concerning other
working conditions. Inmates injured while working on prison jobs
are sometimes unable to obtain injury compensation. Prior to
1966, federal prisoners were able to sue under the Federal Tort
Claims Act for injuries caused by the government's negligence, 8
but the Federal Prison Industries inmate compensation system 9
now provides the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries.90
Almost all state prisoner claims under workmen's compensation
laws have failed,91 usually because inmates are not included with-
in the statutory definition of "employee." 9 2 A few claimants have
85 United States ex rel. Raymond v. Rundle, 276 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (regu-
lation setting aside 10 percent of wages held reasonable even as to prisoner under death
sentence); Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959), rev'd on other grounds
sub noma. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961). cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862
(1961).86 Siegel v. Ragen, 180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 1950). cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950).
rehearing denied, 340 U.S. 847 (1950) (typewriter); Piccoli v. Board of Trustees and
Warden of State Prison, 87 F. Supp. 672 (D.N.H. 1949) (set of revised laws).
87 Sigler v. Lowrie, 404 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 940 (1969).
88 United States v. Muniz. 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
8 Under 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1970), the Federal Prison Industries Corporation is autho-
rized, under rules and regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, to pay com-
pensation to inmates or their dependents for injuries sustained in any industry or work
activity in connection with maintenance or operation of the institution. The Attorney
General's authority to prescribe rules and regulations in this area has been transferred to
the Board of Directors of the Federal Prison Industries or such officers as the Board
designates. 28 C.F.R. § 0.99 (1972). The current regulations governing inmate accident
compensation appear at 37 Fed. Reg. 138, §§ 301.-.18 (1972).
9 0 United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966); Granade v. United States. 356 F.2d
837 (2d Cir. 1966).
9 1 Watson v. Industrial Comm'n, 100 Ariz. 327, 414 P.2d 144 (1966), rev'g 3 Ariz. App.
32, 411 P.2d 455 (1966); Taylor v. Arkansas Light & Power Co., 173 Ark. 868, 293 S.W.
1007 (1927); Lawson v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 37 Ga. App. 85. 139 S.E. 96 (1927); Shain v.
Idaho State Penitentiary, 77 Idaho 292. 291 P.2d 870 (1955); Schraner v. Indiana Dep't of
Correction, 135 Ind. App. 504, 189 N.E.2d 119 (1963); Jones v. Houston Fire and
Casualty Ins. Co.. 134 So. 2d 377 (La. App. 1961); Moats v. State. 215 Md. 49, 136 A.2d
757 (1957); Greene's Case. 280 Mass. 506, 182 N.E. 857 (1932); Brown v. Jamesburg
State Home for Boys, 60 N.J. Super. 123, 158 A.2d 445 (1960); Goffv. Union County, 26
N.J. Misc. 135, 57 A.2d 480 (1948); Scott v. City of Hobbs, 69 N.M. 330. 366 P.2d 854
(1961); City of Clinton v. White Crow, 488 P.2d 1232 (Okla. 1971); In re Kroth, 408 P.2d
335 (Okla. 1965); Murray County v. Hood, 163 Okla. 167, 21 P.2d 754 (1933); Kopacka
v. Dep't of Industry, Labor, & Human Relations, 49 Wis. 2d 255, 181 N.W.2d 487 (1970).
Cf. Turner v. Peerless Ins. Co., 110 So. 2d 807 (La. App. 1959).See generally Comment,
The Employment Relation in Workmen's Compensation and Employer's Liability Legisla-
tion, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 161, 176 (1962).92 The term "employee" is usually defined as "every person in the service of an
employer under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or im-
plied." A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES AND
DEATH, § 43.00 (Desk ed. 1972). See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 3351 (West 1971). The
common law definition of employee or servant is used in workmen's compensation cases
and right to control is the primary test. A. LARSON, supra at §§ 43.00-.30. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
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been successful, however. One court held that, while inmates
working inside prison walls were not covered by workmen's com-
pensation, prisoners working upon state highways were "employ-
ees."93 Other courts have held that there is an employment rela-
tion when inmates work outside the prison on a voluntary basis
under the control of third parties. 94
Inmates' outside business interests may be curtailed by prison
authorities. A warden may prohibit both registration of prisoner
inventions with the patent office and their consignment to manu-
facturers 5 Prison officials may restrict correspondence relating
to efforts to publish a book 96 and can forbid the removal of a
manuscript from the prison0 7 It has been held, however, that an
inmate's writing is not the property of the state,98 and a 25
percent charge on payments received for inmate manuscripts and
paintings was held impermissible under the California prisoner
rights law.99
Prisoners' right to organize unions has not yet been fully recog-
nized. The first prisoners union was formed at Green Haven State
Prison in Stormville, New York, 100 and similar organizing at-
tempts have been made at Jackson, Michigan, 1'0 and else-
93 California Highway Comm'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n. 200 Cal. 44, 251 P. 808
(1926). After this decision, convicts were specifically excluded from the definition of
"employees" in the California Workmen's Compensation Statute, CAL. LABOR CODE
§ 3352(e) (West 1971), and the Penal Code was also amended to state that prisoners were
not to be considered "employees" and did not fall under workmen's compensation cov-
erage. See CAL. PENAL CODE, §§ 2700, 2766, 2791 (West 1970). This exclusion applies
only to state prisoners. Jail inmates working under circumstances similar to those present
in California Highway Comm'n, supra, have been held to be entitled to workmen's
compensation. See note 94 infra.9 4 Johnson v. Industrial Comm'n, 88 Ariz. 354, 356 P.2d 1021 (1960); State Com-
pensation Ins. Fund v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd. 8 Cal. App. 3d 978, 87
Cal. Rptr. 770 (1970); Pruitt v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd.. 261 Cal. App. 2d
546, 68 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1968). Cf. Moore v. Murphy, 254 Iowa 969, 119 N.W.2d 759
(1963).
95 United States ex rel. Wagner v. Ragen. 213 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
US. 846 (1954), rehearing denied, 348 U.S. 884 (1954).
96 Stroud v. Swope. 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951). But
cf. Tyler v. Ciccone, 299 F. Supp. 684 (W.D. Mo. 1969).97 Davis v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 345 P.2d 513 (1959). Cf. Maas v.
United States, 371 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
9 8 Davis v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 18- 19, 345 P.2d 513, 520 (1959). The
American Friends' Bill of Rights for Prisoners includes "Exclusive title to and control
over all products of literary, artistic, or personal craftmanship produced on the prisoner's
own time." AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, 168-69
(1971).
99In re van Geldern, 5 Cal. 3d 832, 97 Cal. Rptr. 698, 489 P.2d 578 (1971). See CAL.
PENAL CODE §2600 (West 1970).10 0 10 CRIM. L. REP. 2364 (1972): N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1972, at 1, col. 2.
101 See Prisoners' Labor Union at Jackson v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 346
F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (inmates complained that anti-organization activities
violated constitutional rights; court abstained).
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where. u02 The movement at Green Haven stalled when the State
of New York ruled that prisoners could not form unions because
they are not "state employees."' 03 Some suggest that unions
would have positive rehabilitative effects and would reduce ten-
sion and administrative problems.' 0 4 Pending federal legislation
would guarantee prisoners' right to unionize.' 05
The courts have not squarely dealt with the right to form
unions, but they have accorded some protection for organizational
activities. The Second Circuit ruled that prison officials had to
deliver letters concerning the organization campaign at Green
Haven, 06 and a federal district court in Rhode Island enjoined
prison officials from interfering with organizational activities of
the National Prisoners Union. 07 It has been suggested that at
least a limited right to organize exists; 08 the protection afforded
first amendment rights, 0 9 coupled with the Coffin rationale, 1 0
indicates that the courts might well recognize this right."'
The prison labor system has been challenged occasionally on
constitutional grounds, but these suits have been unsuccessful.
One constitutional argument is that forced labor without com-
pensation constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by
the eighth amendment."12 Courts have rejected this contention. 1 3
102 See Browning, Organizing Behind Bars, RAMPARTS, Feb., 1972, at 40-45, reprinted
in PRISONS, PROTEST, AND POLITICS 132-39 (B. Atkins & H. Glick eds. 1972).
103 N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1972, at 28, col. 5.
104 See Comment, Labor Unions for Prison Inmates: An Analysis of a Recent Proposal
for the Organization of Inmate Labor,21 BUFFALO L. REV. 963 (1972); Note, Bargaining
in Correctional Institutions: Restructuring the Relation between the Inmate and the
Prison Authority, 81 YALE L.J. 726 (1972). Cf. Coulson, Justice Behind Bars: Time to
Arbitrate, 59 A.B.A.J. 612 (1973).
1o5 H.R. 2583, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., tit. 11, § 223 (1973). Similar legislation is pending in
Michigan. See Mich. H.B. No. 4193 (1973).
108 Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237 (2d Cir. 1972).
107 National Prisoners Reform Ass'n v. Sharkey. 347 F. Supp. 1234 (D.R.I. 1972).
108 Comment, supra note 104, at 964.
109 See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
110 See notes 15-16 and accompanying test supra.
"I A full discussion of the right of inmates to form unions is, of course. beyond the
scope of this article. Regarding the right of convicts in work-release programs to join
unions where they work, compare National Welders Supply Co.. 145 NLRB 948. 1964
CCH NLRB 12,845, 55 LRRM 1072 (1964) (convict held to have insufficient continuity
of interest with other employees) with Winsett-Simmonds Engineers. Inc., 164 NLRB 611,
1967 CCH NLRB 21,349. 65 LRRM 1164 (1967) (convict allowed to join union).
112 See Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 2, at 208.
113 Fidtler v. Rundle, 316 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp.
1005 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (alternative holding), affd mem., 393 U.S. 266 (1968); Fallis v.
United States. 263 F. Supp. 780 (M.D. Pa. 1967). See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362
(E.D. Ark. 1970). affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971):
To put it another way, while confinement, even at hard labor and without
compensation, is not considered to be necessarily a cruel and unusual punish-
ment it may be so in certain circumstances and by reason of the conditions of
the confinement.
309 F. Supp. at 373.
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It has been held, however, that forcing convicts to perform labor
beyond their strength, dangerous to life or health, or unduly
painful violates the eighth amendment. 114
Allegations that the prison labor system imposes involuntary
servitude in violation of the thirteenth amendment have been
uniformly rejected. 115 These results are compelled by the amend-
ment's specific exemption of convict labor:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, ex-
cept as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction. 116
114 Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683. 687 (E.D. Ark. 1965). See also Application of
Middlebrooks, 88 F. Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1950). rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Ross v.
Middlebrooks, 188 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1951). cert. denied, 342 U.S. 862 (1951).
115 Draper v. Rhay. 315 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915
(1963). rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 982 (1964); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp, 362. 372
(E.D. Ark. 1970). affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp.
1005, 1012 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (alternative holding). aff'd mer., 393 U.S. 266 (1968); Kent
v. Prosse. 265 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. Pa. 1967) affd sub nor. Kent v. Prasse, 385 F.2d 406
(3d Cir. 1967). See Lindsey v. Leavy. 149 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1945). cert. denied, 326 U.S.
783 (1946); Fidtler v. Rundle, 316 F. Supp. 535 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Blass v. Weigel, 85.
F. Supp. 775, 781 (D.N.J. 1949); Anderson v. Salant, 38 R.I. 463. 96 A.425 (1916). See
generally Goldfarb & Singer, supra note 2. at 207.
116 U.S. CONST. amend. Xi 1I. § I (emphasis added). Under this language "There can be
no doubt that the State has authority to impose involuntary servitude as a punishment for a
crime," United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149 (1914). but the conclusion of one
court that the exception clause manifested a specific congressional intent to leave the
prison labor system alone is not warranted by the legislative history. Holt v. Sarver. 309
F. Supp. 362, 372 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971). In fact, it is likely
that Congress did not really consider the amendment's effect on prison labor; the concern
in 1864 was the slavery question. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Ist Sess. 1784 (1866)
(remarks of Senator Cowan). The language of the amendment, including the exception
clause, comes from Jefferson's draft of the Ordinance of 1784, which later served as the
basis for the Northwest Ordinance of 1789. The 1784 draft was presented to Congress on
March 1, 1784, by a committee headed by Jefferson. It included the following language:
5. That after the year 1800 of the Christian aera. there shall be neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude in any of the said states, otherwise than in
punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted to
have been personally guilty.
Merriam, The Legislative History of the Ordinance of 1787, 5 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM.
ANTIQUARIAN Soc'Y n.s. 303.,309 (1889). This clause was deleted by Congress on April
19, 1784. After other amendments the Ordinance was adopted, but it was never put into
effect.
In 1787. the Ordinance was altered and Jefferson's slavery clause was resurrected by
Nathan Dane. On July 13. 1787, the Northwest Ordinance was passed by Congress and it
was enacted as part of Statute I, Ch. VIII. on August 7. 1789. Article VI provided that:
There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said terri-
tory. otherwise than in punishment of crimes. whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted: Provided always, that any person escaping into the
same, from whom labour or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the
original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed to the
person claiming his or her labour or service as aforesaid.
I Stat. 51 n.a, at 53 (1789). This language was later used as the basis for the thirteenth
amendment.
Thus, the convict labor exception in the thirteenth amendment is a direct descendant of
Jefferson's language. It was only natural that the anti-slavery amendment would borrow
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The thirteenth amendment has been a useful basis for some
claims, 117 but the convict labor exception is fatal to constitutional
wage claims and severely cripples any suit for inmate wages. 118
B. Wage Claims Under the Federal
Minimum Wage Law
The Fair Labor Standards Act" 9 requires every "employer" to
pay the statutory minimum wage to each "employee" who, in any
work week, is engaged in (1) commerce or (2) the production of
goods for commerce, or (3) is employed in an "enterprise" which
is engaged in commerce or the production of goods for com-
merce. 120 The Act defines an "employer" as "any person acting
directly or in the interest of an employer in relation to an employ-
ee," but excludes federal, state, and local governments, for the
most part, and labor organizations.' 2 ' "Employee" means "any
individual employed by an employer," with exceptions such as
agricultural workers and family members. 22 "Employ" simply
means "to suffer or permit to work."' 23
language from the Ordinance; it is unfortunate that more consideration was not given to
the implications for prison labor. Senator Sumner called the exception "surplusage" and
urged that it be deleted, but Congress was not concerned with the effects of that language.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 1488 (1864).
This aspect of the history of the thirteenth amendment is discussed in Merriam, The
Legislative History of the Ordinance of 1787, 5 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. ANTIQUARIAN
Soc'Y n.s. 303-42 (1889); S. MORISON, H. COMMAGER & W. LEUCHTENBURG, I GROWTH
OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 259-61 (1962). See also J. BARRETT. EVOLUTION OF THE
ORDINANCE OF 1787 (1891); DIRECTORS OF THE OLD SOUTH STUDIES, OLD SOUTH
MEETING HOUSE, BOSTON, THE ORDINANCE OF 1787; W. POOLE, THE ORDINANCE OF
MANASSEH CUTLER (1876). The congressional debates on the thirteenth, fourteenth, and
fifteenth amendments are collected in THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES (A.
Avins ed. 1967). The general history of the thirteenth amendment is treated in tenBroek.
Thirteenth Amendment to, the Constitution of the United States: Consummation to Aboli-
tion and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1951).
117 The amendment has been used to strike down peonage laws, which made it a crime to
induce advances of money by promising to perform services with intent to defraud, i.e.,
with no intent to perform the services. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4 (1944); Taylor v.
Georgia. 315 U.S. 25 (1942); United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914). See Brodie,
The Federally-Secured Right to Be Free from Bondage, 40 GEO. L.J. 367 (1952); Howe,
The Peonage Cases, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 279 (1904). It has also been held that persons
committed to mental institutions cannot be forced to work unless their tasks are reason-
ably related to a therapeutic program or are of a normal housekeeping nature. Jobson v.
Henne. 355 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966); Stone v. City of Paducah. 120 Ky. 322, 86 S.W. 531
(Ky. App. 1905). Cf. Exparte Lloyd. 13 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D.Ky. 1936) (held that holding
an inmate on a federal narcotic farm after the expiration of the period within which the
Surgeon General has estimated a cure would take place would violate the fifth and
thirteenth amendments).
11 At least one organization, the National Prisoners Coalition, advocates repeal of the
convict labor exception. The Freeworld Times, June, 1972, at 9, col. 3.
119 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. II 1972).
12029 U.S.C. § 206 (1970).
121 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970).
12229 U.S.C. § 203(e) (1970).
12329 U.S.C. § 203(g) (1970).
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The courts recognize that indiscreet application of the defini-
tions of the Act would result in coverage of "all employed human-
ity";124 they look at the circumstances in each case to determine
if, in economic reality, an employer-employee relationship ex-
ists. 1 2 The economic reality test was first applied under the
National Labor Relations Act 126 and was later applied in Fair
Labor Standards Act cases. 127 The common law tests of agency,
with their emphasis of control, 28 are not conclusive under the
Act.1 29 Most of the cases dealing with the economic reality test
discuss whether a person is an employee (hence covered by the
Act) or an independent contractor (not covered by the Act),130
and the criteria developed in those cases are not particularly
helpful in the prison labor situation. There are no simple and
uniform tests which can be used in determining the scope of the
Act. 3 1 It is clear that the definitions in the Act must be consid-
ered in light of the purpose of the legislation and that the total
factual situation, rather than isolated factors or technical con-
cepts, governs.' 32 When these vague criteria have been applied in
the context of convict labor, courts have found that, in economic
reality, no employment relationship exists. 133
124 Walling v. Sanders, 136 F.2d 78, 81 (6th Cir. 1943).
12 Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961); Wirtz v. Silbert-
son, 217 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
126 NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 129 (1944).
127 See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947).
12 8 See RESTATEMENT (Second) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958):
(1) A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs of
another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performances of
the servant is subject to the other's control or right to control.
129 Walling v. Wabash Radio Corp., 65 F. Supp. 969 (W.D. Mich. 1946), aff d, 162 F.2d
391 (6th Cir. 1947). This means that the cases in which prisoners have been held not to be
"employees" under workmen's compensation laws are not determinative of prisoners'
status under the Fair Labor Standards Act. See notes 91-94 supra.
130 See, e.g., United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704 (1947).
131 Wirtz v. Silbertson, 217 F. Supp. 148, 152 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
132 Goldberg v. Whitaker House Cooperative, 366 U.S. 28 (1961); Bartels v. Birming-
ham, 332 U.S. 126 (1947); Rutherford Food Corp, v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722. 730 (1947);
Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148, 150-52 (1947). See also NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. III, 129 (1944). See generally Willis, The Evolution
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 26 U. MIAMI L, REV. 607 (1972); Note, The Scope of
Coverage Under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 149
(1973).
133 Presently the Fair Labor Standards Act is relevant to the inmate worker only if he
does not work in the prison, i.e., he must have a job in an "outside" industry which has
located facilities within the prison walls or be involved in some sort of work-release
program. However, the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1973, which were passed by
Congress in August and vetoed by President Nixon on September 6, 1973, would have
expanded the coverage of the Act to include federal, state, and local governments. See
H.R. 7935, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973). The basic change in this area would have
amended the definition of "employer" at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970). to include the
"United States or any State or political subdivision of a State." H.R. 7935, 93d Cong. 1st
Sess., tit. 11,§ 201 (1973). See H.R. REP. No. 93-232, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); 31
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Inmates have attempted to secure minimum wage protection
under the Fair Labor Standards Act in three cases, all of which
have been decided on motions prior to trial. In the first of these,
Huntley v. Gunn Furniture Co.,13 4 plaintiff-inmates worked in the
prison stamping plant at Jackson, Michigan, producing shell cas-
ings for the defendant. The defendant company furnished the
necessary materials and paid Michigan Prison Industries a fixed
sum per day for each inmate's work. The critical issue was wheth-
er the inmates were "employees" of the manufacturer.
The court held that inmate labor belonged to the State of
Michigan and that only the state could employ it.' 35 This holding,
combined with the finding that the plaintiffs were under the sole
control and direction of prison officials, 1 3 6 was determinative. The
"economic reality" test was not well-developed in 1948 when
Huntley was decided, but the court realized that the common law
tests of employment relationships were not determinative. The
judge pointed out that control is still a factor and noted that one
does not become an employer merely because he receives benefit
from the services of an individual.1 3 7 The court's holding that the
inmates were employees of Michigan Prison Industries rather
than the defendant companies meant that the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act did not apply. 13 8
The decision in Huntley was heavily relied upon in Sims v.
Parke Davis Co.,'3 9 which also involved inmates in the state
prison at Jackson, Michigan. Plaintiff inmates worked in chemical
research clinics built within the prison by defendants, Parke
CONG. Q. 2108, 2146-47 (1973). If similar amendments are passed, the principles dis-
cussed here will be of interest to inmates who work in prison maintenance jobs or prison
industries. Extension of the Act to the states would probably be a valid exercise of the
commerce power. See Maryland v. Wirtz. 392 U.S. 183 (1968): HR. REP. No. 93-232.
93d Cong.. Ist Sess. 6 (1973); Note, supra note 132; Note. The Fair Labor Standards
Act-Its Application to Hospitals, Nursing Homes and Schools, 19 DRAKE L. REV. 177.
183-86 (1969); Note. Constitutional Law-1966 Amendments to the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act-Commerce Power Held Paramount to State Sovereignty, 14 WAYNE L. REV.
627 (1968). See also United States v. Darby. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). The broad definitions
of product. goods, and enterprise also indicate that prison industries would fit within the
scheme of the Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(b), (j). (i), (r) (1970). as amended, (Supp. II 1972).
The administrative standards governing the scope of the Fair Labor Standards Act are
found at 29 C.F.R. § 776.0 et seq. ( 1972). Qualification of inmates as "employees" has
been and will continue to be the main obstacle.
13479 F. Supp. 110 (W.D. Mich. 1948).
135 79 F. Supp. at 113.
136 79 F. Supp. at 112- 13.
13779 F. Supp. at 114- 15.
13879 F. Supp. at 116.
139334 F. Supp. 774 tE.D. Mich. 1971). affd per curiam, 453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir.
1971). cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972). The writers would like to thank Mr. Robert L.
Segar. of Leitson. Dean. Dean, Segar & Hart. Flint. Michigan. for discussing this case
with them.
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Davis and Upjohn, and used for testing drugs on other inmates.
They claimed the difference between the wages they were paid
($0.35 to $1.25 per day) and the federal minimum wage. As in
Huntley, the central issue was whether the inmates were employ-
ees of the defendant drug companies. The economic reality test
was applied and no employment relation was found.
The parties and the court agreed that the defendants' power to
hire, fire, and control the inmates was critical.140 After reviewing
the facts, the judge concluded that although the defendants super-
vised the day-to-day activity of the inmates, prison officials deter-
mined who would work and when, and had overall control of the
inmates. 14 r The court also found that the inmates were actually
paid by the Department of Corrections at rates it had estab-
lished. 142
Predictably, the court found Huntley largely determinative of
the federal minimum wage claim. It concluded that the economic
reality was that the plaintiffs were convicted criminals assigned to
work for the drug companies, which had forgone an employer's
normal rights of control in order to use inmate workers. In such
circumstances the court found no employment relation.143 Per-
haps more important was the conclusion that Congress had not
intended the Fair Labor Standards Act to cover prisoners.144 This
conclusion is probably correct, 145 and, when combined with the
exception clause of the thirteenth amendment, will probably prove
fatal to inmate claims, even in cases where an employment rela-
tion exists in economic reality.
The only other case dealing with a federal minimum wage claim
was also decided on motions for summary judgment. The plaintiff
in Hudgins v. Hart146 helped the defendants extract blood plasma
from other prisoners and alleged that he was their "employee."
The court found that all contractual arrangements were between
the defendants and the prison officials, and that there was no
employer-employee relation. 47 The chief judge noted that the
140334 F. Supp. at 783.
141 334 F. Supp. at 786. Since the case was disposed of on motions for summary
judgment, the court examined affidavits, which were filed with the motions, for the facts.
The court found that there was no conflict between the affidavits submitted by the parties
and ihus no need for a trial. Id. at 784.
142 334 F. Supp. at 786.
143 334 F. Supp. at 787.
144 Id.
145 See S. REP. No. 884, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 3-4 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 1452, 75th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1937); 81 CONG. REC. 7652, 7672, 7885 (1937); 82 CONG. REC. 1386.
1395, 1491, 1505, 1507 (1937); 83 CONG. REC. 7283, 7298, 9260, 9265 (1938).
146 323 F. Supp. 898 (E.D. La. 1971).
147 323 F. Supp. at 899.
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labor of the plaintiff belonged to the penitentiary, and that it was
merely assigned to the defendants. 148 Huntley was treated as
dispositive; the defendants' motions for summary judgment were
granted.149
The decisions in Huntley, Sims, and Hudgins clearly indicate
that inmates are not likely to be successful in pressing wage
claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Sims court left
room for finding coverage of prisoners under certain circum-
stances, 150 but not many inmates will be able to establish an
employer-employee relation under the economic reality test. In
the absence of new legislation, only an inmate involved in a
work-release program has a reasonable chance for success. This
conclusion is compelled not only by the economic reality test and
congressional intent underlying the Fair Labor Standards Act, but
by the thirteenth amendment as well.
C. Claims Under State Minimum
Wage Legislation
The plaintiffs in Sims v. Parke Davis Co.151 also set forth a
claim under the Michigan Minimum Wage Law of 1964.152 The
Michigan Act exempts employers subject to the Federal Fair
Labor Standards Act unless the application of the Federal Act
would result in a lower wage than that set by the Michigan law. 153
The court accepted plaintiffs' argument that this exemption did
not preclude application of the Michigan Act to the defendant
drug companies, even though they were jurisdictionally subject to
the Federal Act, since they were excused from paying the federal
minimum wage. 1 54
The Michigan Act defines "employ," "employer," and "em-
ployee" in almost the same terms as the Federal Act, 155 and
although these definitions had never been construed by a Mich-
igan court, the federal court in Sims concluded that the economic




150 334 F. Supp. at 788.
151 334 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. Mich. 1971), affd per curiam, 453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
152 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 408.381-.397 (1967), as amended, (Supp. 1973).
sa Micti. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 408.394 (Supp. 1973).
154 334 F. Supp. at 788.
115 The Michigan definitions are found in Micti. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 408.382 (1967).
Cf. notes 119-23 supra, the definitions under the Federal Act.
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used in Michigan in connection with other remedial legislation. 156
Therefore, the decision that the inmates were not "employees"
under the Fair Labor Standards Act also determined their state
law claim, and the motion for summary judgment was granted. 157
The same result is likely in other states. Most state minimum
wage legislation defines "employ," "employer," and "employee"
in language similar to or the same as that of the Federal Act,' 58
and the same considerations will probably be taken into account
when looking for an employment relation. Many state acts speci-
fically exclude the state from coverage as an employer; 5 9 even
where the state is included, as it is under the Michigan Act,' 6 0
inmates working in the prison will not be covered since they are
not "employees.' ' 61 Thus, state minimum wage laws will not
provide a remedy for most inmates, whether they work for the
prison system or for private industry located within prison walls.
Inmates working on state highways or public buildings might
raise wage claims under state laws that provide that not less than
the prevailing wage shall be paid to laborers working on public
works projects. 62 The plaintiff in the only case involving such a
claim 163 was permitted, at his own request, to do carpentry work
on public buildings for $2.00 a day while he was confined in the
county jail. After his release, he claimed the difference between
what he was paid and the prevailing wage rate in the area for
similar work ($2.00 per hour) under the Kansas public works
law.' 64 The court noted that the plaintiff could have been forced
156334 F. Supp. 788-89. See Goodchild v. Erickson. 375 Mich. 289, 293, 134 N.W.2d
191. 193 (1965); Tata v. Benjamin Muskovitz Plumbing & Heating. 354 Mich. 695, 699,
94 N.W.2d 71. 74 (1959); Foster v. Michigan Employment Security Comm'n, 15 Mich.
App. 96, 99- 101, 166 N.W.2d 316, 317- 19 (1968).
157 334 F. Supp. at 789.
158 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 1001- 1015 (1971), as amended, (Supp. 1972);
N.Y. LABOR LAW § 650-665 (McKinney 1965). as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1972);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 653.010 et seq. (1971) (U.S., state, and political subdivisions exempt.
§ 653.020 (1971)); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 333.103 et seq. (Supp. 1973) (U.S., state, and
political subdivisions exempt, tit. 43, §333.105 (Supp. 1973)); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN., art 515 d (1971) (inmates expressly exempted, art. 51.59d,§ 4(b) (7) (1971)).
159 See note 158 supra.
160 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 408.382(c) (1967).
161 At least two states expressly provide that inmates are not "employees." See ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §31-254 (Supp. 1970); CAL. PENAL CODE §§2700, 2766, 2791 (West
1970).
162 Many states have passed this sort of legislation. See, e.g., CAL. LABOR CODE § 1770
et seq. (West 1971), as amended, (West Supp. 1973); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 39s-1 et
seq. (1971), as amended, (Supp. 1972); MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. §408.551 et seq.
(1967); N.Y. LABOR LAW § 220 (McKinney 1965), as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1972)
(But see § 220(4) (McKinney 1965) which exempts most persons regularly employed by
the state); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4115.05 (Page 1965), as amended, (Page Supp. 1972);
TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5159a (1971). See also Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.
§276a (1970). See generally Annot.. 18 A.L.R.3d 944 (1968).
163 Dice v. Board of County Comm'rs, 178 Kan. 523, 289 P.2d 782 (1955).
164KAN. STAT. ANN. §44-201 (1964).
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to work without any pay at all and simply held that the wage law
was not applicable in such a case. 165 It is likely that claims by
inmates who work on public works projects in other states will
receive the same summary treatment.
D. Claims Under a Quantum Meruit
or Assumpsit Theory
The third count of the complaint in Sims v. Parke Davis Co. 166
made an ingenious claim for damages based, in part, on the
alleged illegality of the contract between the state and the defend-
ant drug companies. Plaintiff inmates asserted that the arrange-
ment with the drug companies 6 7 violated Section 6 of the Mich-
igan Correctional Industries Act 68 which provides in part:
The labor of inmates shall not be sold, hired, leased, loaned,
contracted for or otherwise used for private or corporate
profit or for any purpose other than the construction, mainte-
nance or operation of public works, ways or property as
directed by the governor. 169
For purposes of the civil suit, it was assumed that the agreement
violated the law and the question was whether such a violation
provided a foundation for a damage claim. A similar allegation
was made in Huntley,'70 but the court found it unnecessary to
discuss the validity of the contract.' 71
The inmates acknowledged that the state had the right to use
their labor, but they maintained that their labor belonged to them
except to the extent that it was legally taken away by the state.' 72
From this premise they argued that, since the use of their labor by
the drug companies violated Michigan law, the labor used by the
companies belonged to the inmates, and that, therefore, the law
should imply a promise to pay a reasonable wage for work per-
formed at another's request or with his knowledge. 173 The court
rejected this argument and followed Huntley"74 and other prece-
165 178 Kan. at 524-25, 289 P.2d at 784.
166334 F. Supp. 774 (E:D. Mich. 1971), affd per curiarn, 453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
16 7 See notes 138-39 supra.
168 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.321-.335 (Supp. 1973).
169 MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.326 (Supp. 1973). Many states have similar statutes
which prohibit the contracting out of prison labor. See notes 230-32 and accompanying
text infra.
170 Huntley v. Gunn Furniture Co., 79 F. Supp. 110 (W.D. Mich. 1948).
171 Id. at 116.
172 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants at 3 1, Sims v. Parke Davis & 1po., 453 F.2d 1259 (6th
Cir. 1971) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Plaintiffs].
173 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 172, at 32.
174 Huntley v. Gunn Furniture Co., 79 F. Supp. 110 (W.D. Mich. 1948).
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dents 175 which indicate that the labor of inmates belongs to the
state, no matter how it is used. The court held that there could be
no quantum meruit recovery since the inmates had not been
deprived of any labor which belonged to them.176
A second aspect of this argument was based on a few cases
which hold that, if an inmate is illegally compelled to work for an
individual, he has suffered a tort, which he may waive and follow
with a suit in assumpsit. The theory is that the defendant has been
unjustly enriched through his tortious act and that the plaintiff
may sue to recover the benefits received by the wrongdoer. 177
Most of the cases employing this theory involve situations where
the contract for the convict's labor was illegal because the con-
tract was made without authority, 78 the inmate was sentenced by
a court without jurisdiction, 179 or the convict was required to
work after his sentence had expired.' 8 0 Each of these cases in-
volved a situation in which compelling any labor at all was illegal.
Even in these circumstances, the cases are not in complete accord
as to whether a claim can be maintained.' 8 '
In Sims the inmates were legally incarcerated and could be
compelled to work. Consequently, they had to rely on the Correc-
tional Industries Act to provide a basis for their claim. Their
argument was that tort liability may be inferred from a violation of
the criminal statute.' 8 2 The court rejected this argument because
the inmates were not within the class of persons meant to be
protected by the statute, and therefore a civil remedy could not be
implied in their favor.'8 3 This holding was probably correct since
175 See notes 77-87 and accompanying text supra.
176334 F. Supp. at 791.
177 This theory is closely related to the quantum meruit aspect of this claim. Under the
quantum meruit theory the inmates asked for the reasonable value of their work. In
"waiving" the tort and suing in assumpsit the plaintiffs sought to recover the amount by
which the drug companies had been unjustly enriched through their tortious conduct. This
latter remedy is an alternative to traditional tort damages where the tort has resulted in
unjust enrichment. For a general discussion of this theory, see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 94 (4th ed. 1971).
178 Greer v. Critz, 53 Ark. 247, 13 S.W. 764 (1890).
179 Patterson & Another v. Prior, 18 Ind. 440 (1862); Patterson v. Crawford, 12 Ind.
241 (1859).
'
8 0 Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Butler. 187 Ala. 51, 65 So. 804 (1914);
Chattahoochee Brick Co. v. Goings, 135 Ga. 529,69 S.E. 865 (1910).
181 See Thompson v. Bronk, 126 Mich. 455, 85 N.W. 1084 (1901); Sloss Iron & Steel
Co. v. Harvey, 116 Ala. 656, 22 So. 994 (1897).182 See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 177. at §36. There is dictum in one case
which supports the theory that an illegal contract will support an assumpsit action in favor
of an inmate. See Anderson v. Salant, 38 R.I. 463.96 A. 425 (1916). But see Sloss Iron &
Steel Co. v. Harvey, 116 Ala. 656, 22 So. 994 (1897), where the defendants violated a
statute by forcing plaintiff convicts to work on Sundays. The court held that the defend-
ant's action was tortious, but denied a quantum meruit remedy on the ground that the
plaintiffs were properly held in custody and that, therefore, no promise to pay them could
be implied.
183 334 F. Supp. at 79 1.
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the Michigan Act was not intended to protect inmates,18 4 and
generally accepted tort rules indicate that, where plaintiffs are not
within the class of persons intended to be protected by the statute,
they do not have any statutorily protected interest and they may
not recover in an implied civil action.'85
The quantum meruit and assumpsit arguments are both novel
and interesting, but they are technical and based on cases which
are old and contradictory. These theories might be used in a wage
action by a plaintiff who was illegally incarcerated or by one who
was convicted and had won reversal on appeal. Given the prob-
lems inherent in any implied remedy and the courts' general view
of the legal status of prisoners,18 6 the quantum meruit and as-
sumpsit theories will be of little use in a wage action by an inmate
who has been duly convicted and sentenced.
E. The Constitutional Claim
The plaintiffs in Sims also argued that their thirteenth and
fourteenth amendment rights were violated by treatment allegedly
at variance with the Michigan Correctional Industries Act and the
state and federal minimum wage laws.' 87 This claim was based on
the premise that the plaintiffs retained the right to dispose of their
labor except to the extent that the state has lawfully taken it away
from them.1 88 The Sims court rejected this position under the
quantum meruit argument and also refused to accept it as a basis
for a constitutional claim. Following Draper v. Rhay, 89 Sigler v.
Lowrie,'90 and the exception clause of the thirteenth amendment,
the court held that the inmates had no right not to work and that
there had been no violation of thirteenth amendment rights, imply-
ing that the plaintiffs had no rights to their own labor. 19'
A full-blown constitutional attack against the prison wage sys-
tem is probably impossible. The Supreme Court has pointed out
that "the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for
184The purpose and intent of the act is set out in MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §800.331
(Supp. 1970) which declares that one of the purposes is "[to eliminate all competitive
relationships between inmate labor or correctional industries products and free labor or
private industry."
'85See Wyandotte Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201-02 (1967);
W. PROSSER, supra note 177, at § 36; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 286, 288
(1965).
186 See notes 77- 117 and accompanying text supta.
187 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 172, at 46.
188 Brief for Plaintiffs, supra note 172. at 48.
189315 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 915 (1963). rehearing denied,
375 U.S. 982 (1964).
190 404 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1968). cert. denied, 395 U.S. 940(1969).
191 334 F. Supp. at 792-93.
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every social and economic ill."192 There is no constitutional right
to the minimum wage for anyone. The only ground for con-
stitutional attack is that exclusion of prisoners from coverage of
state and federal minimum wage laws is a denial of equal protec-
tion.193
Exclusion from state law coverage could be attacked on equal
protection grounds, but under the current analysis the courts
examine legislation that discriminates among classes of persons
and generally require only that there be a rational relationship
between the purpose of the legislation and the classifications it
draws. Legislation is presumed to be valid in these cases and the
plaintiff must demonstrate that no set of facts can justify the
statutory scheme or that the statutory objectives are beyond the
state's power. The fact that a law affects various groups
differently does not mean that it violates the fourteenth amend-
ment. 1
94
Where a constitutional right is at stake, a "fundamental" in-
terest is involved, or a "suspect" classification is used, however,
the state bears the burden of showing that the classifications used
are necessary to advance a compelling state interest and that the
same purpose cannot be accomplished by less drastic means. 195
The Coffin rationale' 96 and the recent expansion of inmate rights
indicate that there is no reason to alter these tests when exam-
ining the constitutional claims of prisoners. 197 This discussion
192 Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
193 It might be argued that the exception clause of the thirteenth amendment means only
that a prisoner loses the right to choose whether to work or not. The condition of
involuntary servitude, or the loss of the right not to work, does not necessarily mean that a
prisoner is not entitled to compensation for forced labor. There does not seem to be any
support in the cases for drawing a distinction between the right to choose not to work and
the right to be paid for labor, and even if such a distinction could be drawn, it might be
difficult to establish a right to compensation.194San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. I (1973); Weber v.
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56,
70-71 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
425- 26 (1961); Kotch v. Board of River Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947).
195 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960). See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179. 216 (1973); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155-56 (1973). Cf. Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 645
(E.D. Va. 1971).
196 See notes 15- 17 and accompanying text supra.
197 Mabra v. Schmidt, 356 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. Wisc. 1973); Morales v. Schmidt, 340
F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wisc. 1972), rev'd,-F.2d__ (7th Cir. 1973). See generally Hollen,
Emerging Prisoners' Rights, 33 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1972); Rabinowitz, The Expansion of
Prisoners' Rights, 16 VILL. L. REV. 1047, 1054 (1971); Singer, Sending Men to Prison:
Constitutional Aspects of the Burden of Proof and the Doctrine of the Least Drastic
Alternative as Applied to Sentencing Determinations, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 5I (1972);
Singer. Privacy, Autonomy, and Dignity in the Prison: A Preliminary Inquiry Concerning
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assumes that the traditional tests apply, although there is some
reason to suspect that they might not be applied in the prison
context by all courts. 198
The Supreme Court has made it clear that in the areas of social
welfare and economics, the constitutionality of legislation will be
measured by the less stringent rational relationship standard. 199 A
claim for minimum wage protection would clearly fall into this
category. The Court has indicated that a statute does not violate
the equal protection clause because it might have gone further or
done more.200 "The legislature may select one phase of one field
and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others." 20' This is what
the states have done in minimum wage legislation, and it seems
unlikely that the omission of prisoners from coverage amounts to
a denial of equal protection of the laws.
Although the equal protection clause does not apply to the
federal government,20 2 the analysis employed by the Court in
testing federal statutes under the due process clause of the fifth
amendment is very similar to that used in equal protection
cases.20 3 This similarity and the application of traditional substan-
tive due process standards 20 4 probably mean that inmates cannot
successfully attack exclusion from coverage under the Fair Labor
Standards Act as a violation of the fifth amendment. 20 5
Constitutional Aspects of the Degradation Process in Our Prisons, 21 BUFFALO L. REV.
669 (1972). Singer, Bringing the Constitution to Prison: Substantive Due Process and the
Eighth Amendment, 39 U. CIN. L. REV. 650, 667-71, 683 (1970); Turner, supra note 2, at
508-11. Cf. Singer, Prisoners As Wards of the Court-A Non-constitutional Path to
Assure Correctional Reform by the Courts, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 769 (1972).
198 See McGinnis v. Royster. 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 480, 483 (1972); Johnson v. Avery. 393 U.S. 483, 486 (1969); Morales v. Schmidt,
-F.2d.. (7th Cir. 1973). rev'g 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wisc. 1972); Baldwin v. Smith.
446 F.2d 1043, 1044-45 (2d Cir. 1971). rev'g 316 F. Supp. 670 (D. Vt. 1970); Courtney
v. Bishop. 409 F.2d 1185. 1187 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 915 (1969); Ray v.
Pennsylvania. 263 F. Supp. 630, 631 (W.D. Pa. 1967).
199Jefferson v. Hackney. 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972) (AFDC benefits); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85 (1970) (AFDC benefits).20 0Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948); Roschen v. Ward. 279 U.S. 337, 339
(1929)
201 Williams v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
202 Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329 (1943); Helvering v. Lerner Stores
Corp.. 314 U.S. 463 (1941); Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939).203 See United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 41 U.S.L.W, 5105 (U.S. June 25,
1973); United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 41 U.S.L.W. 5099 (U.S. June 25,
1973).204 See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); United States v. Darby. 312 U.S. 100
(1941); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish. 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502 (1934).205See Hurtado v. United States, 403 U.S. 841 (1973). But cf. United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 41 U.S.L.W. 5105 (U.S. June 25, 1973); United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Murry. 41 U.S.L.W. 5099 (U.S. June 25, 1973).
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F. Right to Rehabilitation and
the Minimum Wage
A final basis for arguing that inmates are entitled to the min-
imum wage could be found by tying minimum wages to a right to
rehabilitation. There is general agreement that the primary pur-
pose of prison is rehabilitation, 206 but it is conceded that any
rehabilitation of prisoners today occurs in spite of the prisons. 20 7
No court has held that there is a right to rehabilitation, but a
growing number of commentators have suggested that such a right
may exist.20 8 The arguments for the right to rehabilitation are
usually based on statutory language indicating that the purpose of
the prison system is rehabilitation 20 9 or on analogies to such
judicially recognized rights as a prisoner's right to medical treat-
ment, 210 juveniles' right to rehabilitation,2 1 ' and mental patients'
right to treatment. 212 Courts have thus far rejected inmate claims
206 See Landman v. Royster. 333 F. Supp. 621, 643-45 (E.D. Va. 1971); In re Harrell.
2 Cal. 3d 675, 693. 470 P.2d 640 (1970). cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971); ACA
MANUAL, supra note 18, at 10; Principle VII of the Declaration of Principles of the
American Correctional Association (1970). reprinted in ABA COMPENDIUM, supra note 1,
at X-76; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1. at 56-57; R. CLARK, supra note 34. at 200;
CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 1. at 12; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1. at 16;
Hamilton, Criminal Rehabilitation Should Be Our Top Priority, 7 CRIM. L. BULL. 225
(1971); Leopold.supranote 20, at 34; Singer. supra note I, at 387; MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 1.02(2) (b) (1962); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, STANDARD ACT
FOR STATE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES § 14 (1966). See also ON THE PENITENTIARY SYS-
TEM, supra note 1, at 77.
Some have suggested, however, that prisons cannot rehabilitate. See Carlson, Rehabili-
tating Criminals, CENTER MAG., July/Aug.. 1973. at 27; Martinson. The Paradox of
Prison Reform: The "Dangerous Myth," Can Corrections Correct?, The Meaning of
Attica, Planning for Public Safety, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 1, 1972. at 23-25, Apr. 8. 1972,
at 13-15, Apr. 15. 1972, at 17-19, Apr. 29, 1972. at 21-23.Cf Shockley. Reforming
Prison Reform, COMMONWEAL, Sept. 24. 1971. at 497.
207 ATTICA REPORT, supra note 1. at 4; Leopold. supra note 320, at 42.
208 D. RUDOVSKY, supra note 2, at 89-91; SOUTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF CORRECTION,
supra note 2, at 172; Cohen, The Rights of the Civilly and Criminally Incarcerated, 4
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 399 (1971); Goldfarb & Singer. supra note 2, at 208-15; Hollen,
supra note 197, at 68-75; Turner, supra note 2, at 502; Comment. A Jam in the Revolving
Door: A Prisoner's Right to Rehabilitation, 60 GEo. L.J. 225 (1971); Note. 41 U. CIN. L.
REV. 716, 720-21 (1972).209 Comment, supra note 208, at 236-37. See Comment, A Statutory Right to Treat-
ment for Prisoners: Society's Right of Self-Defense, 50 NEa. L. REV. 543 (1971) (dis-
cusses various state statutes which might give rise to a right to rehabilitation).210 See United States ex rel. Hyde v. McGinnis. 429 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1970); Newman
v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
211 See In re Elmore, 382 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106
(D.C. Cir. 1967); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451. 459 (N.D. Ind. 1972. Supp.
Opinion 1973); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck. 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I.
1972); United States v. Alsbrook, 336 F. Supp. 973 (D.D.C. 1971); Note, 41 U. CIN. L.
REV. 716 (1972).212 See Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Rouse v. Cameron. 373
F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Millard v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971); Symposium, The Right to Treatment, 57
GEO. L.J. 673 (1969).
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to a right to rehabilitation based on the eighth amendment 213 and
on statutory grounds, 214 but one court has indicated that the
absence of a program of rehabilitation is one factor in evaluating
the constitutionality of a prison system. 215
If courts are persuaded that there is a right to rehabilitation,
either statutory or constitutional, inmates might argue that, given
the acknowledged benefits of the minimum wage for prisoners and
the harmful effects of the present system, the minimum wage must
be a part of any adequate rehabilitation program. Whether future
courts would accept this argument and hold that there is a deriva-
tive right to minimum wages is unclear; it is certainly not a viable
basis for an inmate minimum wage claim today.
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
A. Providing the Minimum Wage for Inmates
The foregoing discussion indicates that there is presently no
judicially cognizable right of prisoners to receive the minimum
wage. If, as a policy matter, the minimum wage proposal is to be
implemented, it must be done by new legislation. Two bills cur-
rently before Congress would accomplish this purpose. The Om-
nibus Penal Reform Act of 1972,216 introduced by Representative
Dellums, 217 contains a comprehensive penal reform package. Title
II of the bill would amend Title 18 of the United States Code by
providing that not less than the minimum wage under the Fair
Labor Standards Act shall be paid to federal prisoners.
A more sweeping attack on the problem is made by a bill
introduced by Representative Roybal. 218 This legislation provides
that all persons confined in penal or mental institutions in the
United States, the District of Columbia, the states, and political
subdivisions of the states, shall be paid not less than the minimum
wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Passage of this bill
would remove the need for action by the states. Such legislation
could be attacked by the states on constitutional grounds, but
there is a good chance that it could pass constitutional muster if it
213 Smith v. Schneckloth. 414 F.2d 680. 682 (9th Cir. 1969).
214Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Sup . 1005. 1012-13 (N.D. Ga. 1968). affd mem., 393
U.S. 266 (1968).
215 Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir.
1971).
216 H.R. 2583, 93d Cong.. 1st Sgss. (1973).
217 See I 18 CONG. REC. H8128 (daily ed. Sept. 6, 1972) (remarks of Representative
Dellums).
218 H.R. 6745, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1.973).
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were based on the commerce clause. The breadth of the com-
merce clause has been demonstrated time and again. 219 The feder-
al government may regulate the states when they engage in eco-
nomic activities, 220 and the interstate character of prison-made
goods was demonstrated when the Court held that Congress could
exclude them from interstate commerce.2 21 The Roybal proposal
merits serious consideration by Congress, and the policy consid-
erations behind the minimum wage for prisoners222 justify its
enactment. 223 If the bill is not passed by Congress, the states
should consider enacting similar legislation of their own.
B. Removal of Restrictive Legislation
The feasibility of the minimum wage proposal depends on a
number of other legislative reforms. At the present time both
federal and state laws restrict the market for and the sale of
prison-made goods and the use of convict labor. Federal legisla-
tion divests inmate-made goods of their interstate character; 224
prohibits the transportation of inmate-made goods in interstate
commerce and requires labeling such goods as convict-made;2 25
prohibits the purchase of inmate-made goods by the postal ser-
vice;226 prohibits the use of convict labor on airport development
projects 227 and federal-aid highways, 228 and by contractors deal-
ing with the federal government; 229 prohibits the contracting-out
of convict labor; 230 provides that the Federal Prison Industries
shall not compete with private enterprise; 231 and provides that
federal prisoners in state institutions shall be employed only in the
manufacture of state-use goods or on public works projects. 2 32
219 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942). Cf. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
220 Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175
(1936).22 1Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 299 U.S. 334 (1937). Cf.
Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S. 431 (1936).222 See part I supra.
223 Representative Roybal also introduced H.R. 6747, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
which would authorize social security coverage for prisoners and make it possible for
inmates to receive credit for social security as if they were receiving the federal minimum
wage.
224 Hawes-Cooper Act, 49 U.S.C. § 60 (1970). See notes 25-31 and accompanying text
supra.
225 18 U.S.C. §§ 1761-62 (1970). See notes 25-31 and accompanying text supra.
226 39 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
22749 U.S.C. § 1722(c) (1970).
22823 U.S.C. § 114(b) (1970).
22941 U.S.C. § 35(d) (1970).
230 18 U.S.C. § 436 (1970).
231 18 U.S.C. § 4122(a) (1970). See also 18 U.S.C. § 4124 (1970).
2 18 U.S.C. § 4002 (1970).
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Typical state legislation prevents the sale of prison-made goods in
the open market233 and prohibits contracting-out of prison la-
bor.23 4 Some states have added their own labeling require-
ments.23
5
These statutory restrictions have had substantial adverse
effects on prison labor.2 3 6 Many prisoners are idle and those
fortunate enough to have work are often saddled with meaningless
tasks.2 3 7 There is general agreement that the present prison labor
system, forced by law into the state-use model, is a failure.23,
Prison labor should be integrated into the national economy,
rather than isolated in the state-use market, 239 and if prison in-
dustries are to be effective rehabilitative tools and viable econom-
ic entities, they must be modernized and expanded.2 40 Statutory
restrictions on prison labor and markets for prison-made goods
prevent this kind of meaningful reform and should be repealed.2 41
Repeal of the Hawes-Cooper Act,2 42 which divests prison-made
233 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2709, 2880 (West 1970); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38.
§ 1003-12-7 (Supp. 1972); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 800.326 (Supp. 1973); N.Y.
CORREC. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1968) and N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 69 (McKinney 1968);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§5147.01-.02 (Page 1970). as amended, (Page Supp. 1972);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.art. 6203c, § 9(m) (1970).
234See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38. § 1003-12-2 (Supp. 1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
127, § 51 (1972); MIcH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 800.326, 800.331(c) (Supp. 1973); N.Y.
CORREC. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1968); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §5147.01 (Page 1970). as
amended, (Page Supp. 1972) and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5147.12 (Page 1970); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 421.410 (197 1). Similar restrictions may be found in some model legislation.
See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 303.7(4)-(5), 304.8(4)-(5) (1962); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON
CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, STANDARD ACT FOR STATE CORRECTIONAL SERVICES § 15
(1966).
235 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2870, 2881-83, 2885, 2895, 2896 (West 1970); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 61, § 251 (1964); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6166z8 (1970).
3
6 See notes 29-36 supra. See also ACA MANUAL, supra note 18, at 391-92; TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 54-55. 183; Goldart, supra note 18, at 28-29; Morris &
Hawkins, supra note 75, at 14; J. STRATTON & J. WEST, THE ROLE OF CORRECTIONAL
INDUSTRIES-A SUMMARY REPORT 23-26 (1972). Cf. Pitts v. Reagan, 14 Cal. App. 3d
112, 92 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1971).
237 See notes 32-41 and accompanying text supra.
238 See notes 29-41 and accompanying text supra.
239J. BASALO, supra note 53; Lopez-Rey, supra note 18; Report Prepared by the
Secretariat, supra note 56; Report Prepared by the Secretariat, supra note 53.240 See ACA MANUAL, supra note 18, at 387-400; HOUSE REPORT, supra note 1, at
28-30, 60; M. RIQHMOND,supra note 18 at 50-51; N. Singer, supra note 41;J. STRATTON
&J. WEST, Supra note 236; Sturdevant, Goals of Correctional Industries in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE NINETY-NINTH ANNUAL CONGRESS OF CORRECTIONS OF THE AMERICAN COR-
RECTIONAL ASSOCIATION 56 (1969); Taggart, Manpower Programs for Criminal
Offenders, 95 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 17 (1972).
24 1 CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 1, at 176; Goldart, supra note 18, at 29; Morris &
Hawkins, supra note 75, at 14; J. STRATTON & J. WEST, supra note 236. at 26-27;
Taggart, supra note 237, at 20. Cf. Lopez-Rey, supra note 18. at 20. But see Rodli.
Revolution in Prison Industries, 6 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 146, 151 (1960); Williams &
Fish, Rehabilitation and Economic Self-Interest, 17 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 406, 410
(1971). H.R. 5353, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., (1973) would make federal restrictive legislation
inapplicable to prisoners on work-release.
24249 U.S.C. § 60 (1970).
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goods of their interstate character, would be a step in this direc-
tion, since many state laws would constitute unconstitutional re-
strictions on commerce in its absence. 243
It is not clear whether it is politically possible to enact legisla-
tion requiring payment of minimum wages to prisoners and re-
moving restrictions on convict labor and inmate-made goods.
Some sources suggest that organized labor and business are now
willing to cooperate with prison reform,244 but these groups are
responsible for the legislative restrictions which exist today.2 45 As
a practical matter, convict labor is no longer a threat to labor or
business 246 and the implementation of the minimum wage propos-
al would eliminate labor's traditional complaint about competition
from cheap convict labor. The reforms suggested in this article
would not cost immense sums; they would provide immediate and
tangible benefits for prisoners and their families and would make
further reform possible. The legislation discussed here should be
given prompt attention by Congress, and existing laws which
restrict the use of prison labor should be repealed.
-James J. and Wendy S. Maiwurm
243 Before passage of the Hawes-Cooper Act, many statutes restricting the sale of
prison-made goods were found unconstitutional. See, e.g., Hessick v. Moynihan, 83 Colo.
43, 262 P. 907 (1927); Opinion of Justices, 211 Mass. 605, 98 N.E. 334 (1912); People v.
Hawkins, 157 N.Y. 1, 51 N.E. 257 (1898). See generally Annot., 80 L. Ed. 785 (1936).
244 CHALLENGE OF CRIME, supra note 1. at 289; Peris, Labor's Position on the Employ-
ment of Offenders, 6 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 138 (1960); J. STRATTON & J. WEST,
supra note 236. at 24. Cf. Oversight Hearings, supra note 39, at 3-20 (testimony of
James R. Hoffa).
245 H. HAWES, POWER OF CONGRESS TO PROTECT STATE LAWS 2 (1939); Lopez-Rey.
supra note 18, at 19. See also Goldart, supra note 18, at 30. Cf. Pitts v. Reagan, 14 Cal.
App. 3d 112, 92 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1971) (AFL-CIO sued for injunction to prevent use of
convict labor to harvest private crops.).
246 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 55; M. RICHMOND, supra note 18. at 50;
Lopez-Rey. supra note 18. at 19; J. STRATTON & J. WEST, supra note 236, at 26.
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